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Abstract 
 
While financial liberalisation is considered to be good for economic growth in that it promotes the 
development of the financial sector, banking crises on the other hand tend to be inimical for economic 
growth. Moreover, banking crises tend to be preceded by financial liberalisation, as noted in a number of 
studies. This is because financial liberalisation tends to induce greater risk-taking behaviour by agents, 
thus leading to banking crises. In this paper we study the effect of financial liberalisation and banking 
crises on the economic performance of African countries during the period covering 1985 to 2010.  Using 
a treatment effect, two step methods and a panel probit method, our results show that banking crises have a 
negative impact on economic growth meanwhile financial liberalisation tends to reduce the likelihood of 
banking crises in African countries.   
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1. Introduction  
In the late 80s and the early 90s, African countries under the framework of the IMF and the 
World Bank, structural adjustment program, implemented economic reforms. Financial 
liberalisation was the major part of these reforms, with the aim to allow countries to remove 
the distortions in domestic financial markets to permit higher competition and more efficient 
allocation of capital; increasing financial intermediation; to increase access to external 
markets especially long term investment capital, and to reduce corruption through 
deregulation of the financial system. Financial systems play an important role in economic 
development. They attract funds from savers in the surplus sector and channel these to 
borrowers for purposes of profitable investment. A repressed financial system fragments 
domestic capital market with adverse effects on the quality and quantity of real capital 
accumulation. The adoption of financial liberalisation under these circumstances has been 
suggested in order to enhance economic growth, a suggestion which many African countries 
have implemented to various degrees. 
  The general consensus is that financial liberalisation improves financial development    and 
contribute to economic development (e.g. Bakaert and Harvey 2000; Levin, Henry, 2000) 
However, some observers are of the view that the openness of the financial sector can make 
economies more vulnerable to financial instability and may cause banking crises ( Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 2000; Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996, ; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1999).  
The objective of this paper is to analyse and  assess empirically the effect of banking crises 
on the financial liberalisation and Economic Growth of a restricted sample of African 
countries over the period spanning from 1985-2010. Firstly we adopt a treatment effect 
method that can consider the contradictory twofold effect of financial liberalisation. On one 
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hand, it promotes financial development and enhances economic growths, and the other hand, 
it encourages risk taking, generating financial instability and increasing the probability of 
banking crises.  We then employed the panel probit model to estimate the likelihood of 
banking crises on financial liberalisation and economic growth, Our results suggest that 
financial liberalisation has a positive effect on economic growth while banking crises tend to 
be harmful to economic growth but the due to financial liberalisation the likelihood of 
banking crises are lower.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a look at the effect of 
banking crises occurrence on the adjustment of some macroeconomic variables before to and 
after to the banking crises. Section 3 provides the literature review on the determinant of 
banking crises and their link to financial liberalisation and their consequence on economic 
growth.  In Section 4, provides a description of the empirical method and data. Section 5 
reports the results of the findings and in section 6 we have the conclusion. 
 
2.  Banking crises and Macroeconomic Adjustment in African Countries  
Africa was initially believed by many experts to be somehow insulated from the recent global 
financial crisis, because of the relatively limited level of integration of most African financial 
markets with global financial markets. However, the continent has witnessed some adverse 
effects, evidenced in a slowdown in the rate of growth from 4.9% in 2010 to 3.7% in 2011. 
The current financial crisis is now undermining the steady progress that African countries had 
made over the last decade. The consequences are affecting all sectors of these economies 
such as firms, mines, jobs, revenues and livelihoods, resulting in a development crisis. For 
the first time in a decade there will be zero growth per capita. The macroeconomic outlook 
has deteriorated severely, with many countries facing widening current accounts and budget 
deficits. The crisis is reducing trade, the foundation of recent strong growth in Africa. The 
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expected loss in export revenues amount to USD251 billion and USD277 billion in 2010 for 
the continent as a whole, (World Economic Outlook, 2010). In addition, capital inflows are 
also declining, including working remittances and tourism receipts and even the stock of the 
foreign reserve is running low, jeopardising some countries capacity to import even basic 
commodities such as food, medical supplies and agricultural inputs. The private sector has 
been affected by shortage of liquidity in international market, with an adverse impact on trade 
and investment. With some International banks failing to issue lines of credit. 
In this section, we are going to examine the historical banking crises episodes in African 
countries between the 1980s and the 1990s and underline and the macroeconomic adjustment 
paths experienced before and during the crises. We are going to identify the characteristics of 
banking crisis episodes, by looking at the pattern of principal macroeconomic variables as if 
they were eventually affected by the economic downturn before the banking crises, or 
whether the economic slump was caused by banking crises. 
Bordo et al (2001), define banking crises as a period of financial stress resulting in the 
erosion of most or all of the aggregate banking system capital, meanwhile according to 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a), banking crises should be one of the following types of events.  
Bank runs that lead to closure, merger or takeover by the public sector of one or more 
financial institutions, or in the absence of runs, closure merger, takeover, or large scale 
government assistance of an important financial institution that marks the start of a similar 
outcome for other financial institutions.  
 In this analysis we are going to use 37 African countries that have experienced banking 
crises, of which 29  were systemic banking crises (Caprio at al (2005)  and Leaven and 
Valencia,  (2008), most of which occurred in the 90s, between 1990 and 1993 when there 
were about 20 episodes of banking crises in each year ( see Figure 1) .  Our analysis on the 
  
 
 
5
main macroeconomic adjustments will be based on two sections which are the condition prior 
to banking crises and the conditions during the banking crises. 
Table 1 shows the average, median and standard deviation of the peak of GDP growth rate, 
output gap, real credit growth rate and real interest rate before the banking crises.  The peak 
has been identified as five years before the occurrence of the banking crises in each country. 
Most of the countries experienced economic boom that generated positive output gaps and a 
high rate of credit growth. More than 17 countries had a growth rate of GDP more than 5% 
and 10% of the growth rate of real credit. When the average growth of credit to GDP is in 
excess of 10% per annum for three year is known as credit boom. Empirical literature shows 
than banking crises are typically preceded by a lending boom (Gourinchas et al. (2004), 
Tornell and Westermann (2002), Bordo and Jeanne (2002), and IMF (2004)).   
The real credit growth average peak for African Countries that have experienced banking 
crises was around 19% with some countries such as Burundi (38%), Cape Verde (19%), 
Kenya (21%), Nigeria (31%) ,and Mali (21%), having above the medium .  One of the factors 
that could have contributed to these expansions is the process of financial liberalisation that 
most countries were implementing in the 80s and 90s. The capital account liberalisation 
period coincided with openness in the banking sector, letting banks to have greater access 
foreign capital to fund the growth in credit.  This allowed many countries to run huge current 
account deficits over the pre-crisis years. Some countries that   experienced banking crises, 
had a current account deficit as a per cent of GDP that was 10% as a result the central bank 
had to reducing interest rate in response to the overheating economic.  
 The economic slowdown associated with banking crises, (see Table 2) illustrates the main 
macroeconomic component having a considerable decline, with the real credit growth falling 
substantially. This implies a loss of trust between the lenders and the creditors  over the scale 
of losses because of the less credit worthy lending that took place, reducing the funding 
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available to banks. In response, lenders seek to tighten the supply of credit in the market 
provoking a credit crunch, which is a key feature associated with banking crises and 
economic slowdown. Table 7 points out that about 15 countries (Algeria, -101.87%; Burkina 
Faso, -17%; Cameroon,-11%; Niger, -27% and Ethiopia, -30% among others) had a drastic 
collapse of their real credit growth during the banking crises. Most importantly, the average 
of the output gap also fell as a result of the sharp contraction of GDP growth. The economic 
downturn associated with banking crises tended to slowdown the GDP growth which has a 
similar effect on consumption growth.   
 Table 3 looks at the composition of domestic spending adjusted around the banking crises 
and the change in the share of investment in GDP and household consumption growth 
between the peak and the trough in the output gap. The most significant change occurred in 
the trade balance, with a drastic reduction of -354%, demonstrating that African traders are 
more vulnerable to international trade. Behind this high balance of trade deficit are some 
structural weaknesses, which could be due to the possibility that African countries are 
specialised in sectors that are particularly vulnerable to financial crisis. In particular, they are 
more concentrate more on primary good and raw materials, trades which may be more 
dependent on the financial system.  If the low level of development of the financial system 
forces African firms to rely more heavily on trade financing from importing countries and if 
this type of financing is particularly hit by banking crises then this would explain the fragility 
of African exporters to financial crisis in importer countries.  When banks are facing high 
level uncertainty, trust and liquidity are low, banks and firms in the importer country, would 
cut exposure and credit to countries that are consider to be more risky first. 
 The main reason for the reduction of investment during banking crises is due to a lack of 
demand and the deterioration of the firms’ credit conditions, therefore their access to credit is 
lower, forcing them to scale back their investment plans.  Governments sometimes have to 
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intervene using public funds to rescue the banking system and as a consequence reducing 
public investment in the productive sector.   
3. Literature Review  
The themes of  financial liberalisation, banking crises and economic growth in African 
countries has not been tackle empirically but has been done in separate stands. Most of the 
studies dealing with African countries have focused on identifying the effects of financial 
liberalisation on their economies.  Such research can be broadly classified into three groups 
based on the transmission mechanisms of financial liberalisation into the economy, this is 
expected to affect the economy by improving saving and investment and these increases are 
then channelled into faster economic growth rates. Thus, the effects of financial liberalisation 
can be felt by saving, investment and economic growth. Most of the empirical evidences were 
inconclusive and challengeable.   
For instance, studies such as Oshikoya (1992), Kariuki (1995), Mwege (1997) and Ziroklu 
and Barbee (2003) did not find any significant effect of financial liberalisation on saving. 
Other researchers such as Seck and El Nil (1993) and Azam (1996) found that liberalisation 
has had a significantly positive effect on savings. The contradiction of these results can be 
attributed to the type of estimation techniques that were used in deriving the saving equation. 
Mason et al (1993) pointed out that the conclusions concerning the significance of one or 
another factor have often depended on the importance of the choice of time series or cross 
sectional estimation. One other factor that can be credited is the uncertain nature of the effect 
of interest rate changes on saving.  Even if there is some ambiguity in the literature with 
respect to the causality between financial liberalisation and growth; the general consensus is 
that liberalisation is a requirement for increased intermediation associated with financial 
development (see Ranciere et al (2006) and Tressel and Detragiache (2008)).  
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There are others studies, explicitly the model incorporating the effects of financial 
development on economic growth as well as on the likelihood of banking crises which means 
understanding the theory of  the financial system and banking in general. The most 
significant act of financial intermediation is the creation of liquidity. Diamond and Rajan 
(2001) argue that banks need a fragile bank structure to be able to credibly commit to pay 
back fund to depositor.  As a result, the risk of a banking crisis may be a necessary 
disciplinary tool in an imperfect market. If such a risk materialises,  a banking crises arises, 
due to  the various macroeconomic origins of banking crises such as inflation, cyclical output 
downturns, terms of trade deterioration, exchange rate crashes, and currency as well as asset 
and real estate devaluations ( see Lindgren et al., 1996; Dooley and Frankel, 2003; and 
Collyns and Kincaid, 2003) . While a banking crisis is on-going, the credit crunch hypothesis 
predicts that decreased bank credit to firm decreases investment and expenditure, which 
results in decreased economic output and demand (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache, 2005). Government intervention in the banking crises will on the other 
hand result in fiscal costs.  Therefore, government face a trade-off between fiscal and 
economical costs as higher  fiscal spending on government interventions is expected to 
decrease the cost of crises and vice versa (Laeven and Valencia, 2008) .  
Jones and Daniel (2007) have developed a model of a transition period following 
liberalisation showing that financial liberalisation can increase the likelihood of banking 
crises in the medium term while also enhancing economic efficiency. In the model the 
immediate effect of liberalisation is to lower the cost of capital and thereby, to increase real 
investment activity. Banks finance more risky projects and over time projects with lower 
returns will be accepted. At this point, when the capital stock has increased and marginal 
projects offer lower returns, banks become more vulnerable and the likelihood of crises 
increases. 
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Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) found that problems in the banking sector typically precede a 
currency crisis and that a currency crisis deepens the banking crises, activating a vicious 
spiral.  They also found that financial liberalisation often precedes banking crises. Similar 
results were replicated in several papers using different methodologies. 
Demirguc-kunt and Detragiache (1998) studied the empirical relationship between banking 
crisis and financial liberalisation in 53 countries during 1980 and 1995. They found that 
banking crises is more likely to occur in liberalised financial systems. The impact of financial 
liberalisation on the fragility of banks is weaker, however, when the institutional environment 
is strong. They found that bankers franchise values decline after financial liberalisation. 
Hence, the intensification of the moral hazard associated with lower franchise values may be 
one of the sources of increased banking sector fragility. Financial liberalisation is followed by 
improved financial development, while banking crises tend to slow it down. In countries that 
liberalise from a position of financial repression, financial development improves even if a 
banking crisis tends to slow it down. Their results support the view that financial 
liberalisation should be approached cautiously where the institution necessary to ensure law 
and contract enforcement and effective prudential regulation and supervision are not fully 
developed, even if macroeconomic stabilisation has been achieved.  
Eichengreen and Arteta (2002) extend the analysis in Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache by 
distinguishing between the effect of internal and external financial liberalisation. The latter is 
captured by a 0/1 dummy. They find that capital account liberalisation does not contribute to 
a banking crises but the internal financial liberalisation does. Furthermore, they find that 
capital account liberalisation increases the likelihood of banking crises for countries that 
liberalize internally.  Caprio and Summers (1993) and Stiglitz (1994) express the concern that 
financial liberalisation may lead to great financial fragility as banks find greater opportunities 
for risk taking. Through limited liability, lax regulation and supervision, eroding bank capital 
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and implicit as well as explicit guarantees, banks face only little downside risk and therefore 
often as well as explicit guarantees beyond socially desirable limits.     
  
4. Empirical methods and Data 
  We use the treatment effect model to assess the outcome of financial liberalisation and 
banking crises on the economic performance of African countries following the model 
employed by R.Ranciere & al, (2006) in which they simultaneously apply a growth model 
and a crisis model. In order to do that, we add to the standard growth regression a financial 
liberalisation variable and a banking crisis dummy. In particular, we treat that banking crises 
dummy as an endogenous variable that depends on other variables among which is the 
financial liberalisation dummy. 
The literature on the effect of financial liberalisation and explanation of banking crises is 
dominated by the view that increasing financial liberalisation leads to boosting the possibility 
of banking crises. An explanation could be that openness and competition in the financial 
sector would increase the possibility that banking crises erupt as a result of speculative 
performance, as well as sudden shifts in portfolio preferences. In addition, high leverage 
could contribute to the vulnerability of the banking system and may build up during periods 
of optimistic sentiment in the market.  But the main point contradicting this argument is that 
all type of financial liberalisation contributes to more competitive situation wherein banks are 
subject to market discipline providing  an incentive for improved governance, risk 
management and innovation. For market discipline to be effective, financial liberalisation 
must be promoted until a setting level. On these grounds the following hypotheses would be 
verified. The effect of financial liberalisation on the likelihood that banking crises can occur 
controlling others macroeconomic variables. We also verify the effect of financial 
liberalisation and the occurrence of banking crises on the economic performance of African 
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countries. In this scenario, the growth model has the following panel form with  i
 indexing 
the country and t indexing the time period: 
                              ti
crisis
titititi FLy ,,,,, εγβαχ +Β++=
              (1)
 
Where tiy ,  is real per capita GDP growth, ti ,χ is a set of control variables standard in 
the growth regression, tiFL ,  is for the financial liberalisation variables, and  ti ,Β is a dummy 
variable denoting the value of one if a country i  has had banking crises  in period  t  and zero 
if not. Finally, ti ,ε  is a random component. The crisis model treats the financial liberalisation 
crisis
tiB ,  as an endogenous variable which depends on the realisation of an unobserved latent 
variable jtD  in the following way: 
ti
crisisB , otherwiseifD it ,0;0,1{ * >=  
 (2) 
                           ittitijt FLZD ηϕδ ++= ,,*
 
The latent variable  
*
jtB  is assumed to depend linearly on a set of control 
variables tiZ , , on the banking crises dummy 
crisis
tiB , and on a random component itη . Under 
the assumption that ),1,0(~ Nitη  the probit equation model can be represented as: 
crisis
tiB , = {1 with probability: Pr ( jtD >0) = )( ,, crisistiti BZ ϕδ +Φ   
               = {0 with probability: Pr ( jtD >0) = )(1 ,, crisistiti BZ ϕδ +Φ−  
Where Φ  is the cumulative distribution function of standard normal. Thus, the parameters of 
the crisis model can be estimated using a probit model.  This mixed model described above is 
known as a treatment effect model for which standard estimation techniques have been 
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developed (see Heckman (1973) and Maddala (1993)).  The model can be consistently 
estimated using a two step procedure under the assumption that the error term ti ,ε  and itη  are 
bivariate normal but not independent. In the first step, one obtains probit estimates of the 
probability of crisis:   Pr )1( , =CrisistiB = => )0Pr( *itW )( ,,
crisis
titi BZ ϕδ +Φ
  
Where Φ  is the cumulative distribution function of standard function. 
 Using the probit estimates a )(
∧∧
ba , one computes a hazard tih ,  for each observation. In the 
second step, one obtains consistent estimates for the parameters  ( )γβα ,,  of the growth 
model by augmenting regression (1) with the hazard tih , . 
 The equation (1) is the treatment effect model, the banking crises dummy captures the 
treatment, the growth regression is the outcome equation while in the equation  (2) is  the 
treatment equation representing the likelihood to receive the treatment (see S. Edwards, 
(2004)).  
Our sample consists of 53 African countries for which we have information on the dates of 
banking crises and financial liberalisation over the period 1985-2010.  
For the banking crises occurrence which is our dependent variable for the crisis model, we 
adopt a zero-one anecdotal indicator of banking crises, suggested by Caprio and al. (2005) 
and Laeven and Valencia (2008). The onset of banking crises dummy, based on the years of  
banking crises equal to 1  for each banking crises episode (both system and non system 
banking crises), and 0 otherwise. A systemic banking crises is defined as the situation when 
much or all of the banking capital is exhausted, while a non systemic or smaller banking 
crises is identified when there is evidence of  a significant banking problem such as a 
government intervention in banking problem and financial institutions. But in this paper we 
are not going to differentiate the various   types of banking crises occurrence.  
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The extent of financial liberalisation is measured using the capital account openness index; 
KAOPEN developed by Chinn and Ito (2008). KAOPEN is the first principle component of 
the four IMF binary variables, and higher values indicate greater financial openness. One of 
the merits of this index is that it attempts to measure the intensity of capital controls, insofar 
as the intensity is correlated with the existence of other restriction on international 
transactions.    
The dependent variable in the growth model is computed as log difference in real GDP per 
capita. The set of controls for the growth equation is the standard empirical growth variables 
(see Barro, 1987) such as the initial per capita income, government size, trade openness and 
inflation. To account for the financial development we include broad money (M2 as a percent 
GDP) and liquid liabilities as a per cent of GDP.   More detail on the countries in our sample 
and on all the variables is given in the appendix.  
5. Empirical Finding Results  
Our discussions on the estimation focus on the regression results pertaining to financial 
liberalisation, banking crises and economic growth, simply because they are the main focus 
of this study.  Two different types of estimation methods, the treatment effect model and the 
panel probit model, yielded the same outcome which is that financial liberalisation has a 
negative impact on the likelihood of banking crises in African countries. 
In the treatment method estimation (table 5), we have the growth model on the top and a 
crisis model on the bottom. Both of them including the financial liberalisation variable, in the 
growth equation include the banking crises dummy variable and the capital account openness 
index as a proxy of financial liberalisation.  While the crisis model presents the estimates of 
the probit equation with the de facto financial liberalisation dummy. The main results suggest 
that financial liberalisation has positive and significant effects on economic growth at a 10% 
level of significance.  Banking crises has a negative effect on growth meaning that countries 
14 
 
that experience banking crises have a reduction of their growth between the range of (-0.05, -
0.06). The other standard control variables in growth have the expected signs and are 
significant. More importantly, the coefficients of government expenditure and inflation rate 
are negative and significant while real openness and M2 are always positive and significant.     
The crises equation presented in the lower panel in table 5. The results indicate that the 
probability of experiencing banking crises is significantly negative with financial 
liberalisation.  This provides some strong evidence suggesting that countries with a higher 
degree of financial openness have a lower probability of facing banking crisis.  Meanwhile 
countries that have large changes in terms of trade, large current accounts and a high 
volatility of interest rates have a high probability of having banking crises.  
 
 Table 6 shows results using the panel data probit model and the occurrence of banking crises 
as the dependent variable.  In columns 1 and 2, we use a capital account openness index as 
proxy for financial liberalisation while in columns 3 and 4, the years when financial 
liberalisation occurred are used as dummy variables.  Our main findings can be summarized 
as follows. Overall financial liberalisation has a negative impact on the likelihood of banking 
crisis, suggesting that liberalisation of financial sector does lower the probability of banking 
crises. 
The effect of growth of GDP per capita on banking crises in negative and significant at 5% 
confidence level, which reduces the likelihood of banking crisis meanwhile GDP per capita 
level does not have a clear sign even though most of the coefficients are positive but 
insignificant . Other control variables such as the inflation rate, real openness and 
government size have a positive and significant  effect on the likelihood of banking crises, 
suggesting that countries with a high inflation rate,  large government size and well integrated 
in international trade are more likely to have banking crises.   
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Moreover those that have well developed financial sectors have a lower probability of 
banking crises. Our variable uses a proxy for financial development (M2) and has a negative 
and a significant effect on banking crises in all the estimations.  The likelihood ratio and 
Wald test for all the specifications are significant at 1% level of confidence.  
6. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to examine the effect of financial liberalisation and economic growth 
on the likelihood of banking crises in African countries, using data restricted only to African 
countries for the period spanning 1985-2010 and applying the treatment effect method and 
panel probit model.  Our empirical results show that financial liberalisation has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on economic growth while the latter has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on banking crises.  Moreover financial liberalisation reduces the 
likelihood of banking crises, which is in contrast to conventional wisdom. 
The repercussions of this result is that African countries that have liberalised  the financial 
sector to eliminate financial repression and develop better functioning financial markets 
promote economic growth, and have the additional benefit of lowering the probability of 
banking crisis, which has a  dismal effect on growth.    
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Table 1 – Conditions Prior to Banking Crises with Economic Slowdowns: descriptive 
statistics 
 Peak in 
GDP growth 
Rate (%)a 
Peak in 
output gap 
(% GDP) 
Peak in real credit growth rate (%) Peak in real 
Interest rate (%) 
Average  
 
5.188 5.284 19.776 12.680 
Median   
 
6.29 4.56 13.487 13.21 
St. dev.  
 
5.833 4.710 20.328 19.079 
Notes. All peaks have been identified in the 5 years before the occurrence of banking crises.  
 
 
Table 2 – Economic slowdowns associated with banking crises 
 Real credit growth (% 
pts change) 
GDP average 
growth (%)a 
Output gap (%pts 
change) 
Years from peak to through 
in output gap 
Average 
 
-3.740 0.878 -1.414 3.76 
Median 
 
-6.894 1.657 0.31 3 
St.dev. 
 
45.19 5.245 17.049 2.422 
Notes. It represents the average growth of GDP during the crisis. B It has been calculated by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick and 
Prescott, 1981) 
 
 
Table 3 – Expenditure and the Current account. Change in each variable from the Peak 
to the Trough in the Output gap 
 Household consumption 
growth (% pts change) 
Investment share 
(%pts GDP change) 
Trade balance(% pts 
GDP change) 
Current account 
(%pts GDP change) 
Media 
 
-0.890 -0.848 -353.808 -14.283 
Median 
 
0.027 -0.061 -12.683 -13.283 
Dev.St. 
 
4.851 4.879 1985.007 11.842 
Notes. All variables refer to the changes between the peak and the trough in the output gap around the banking crises. 
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                                                 Table 4:   Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean S.Dev. Min. Max. Observations  
Growth GDP per Capita. 0.007 0.06 -0.69 0.65 1150 
Log. GDP per Capita.  6.2 1.07 4.05 9.06 1197 
Log. Government Consumption. 2.6 0.41 0.71 3.86 1113 
Inflation rate 4.7 0.35 4.4 10.1 1079 
Log.M2 3.2 3.2 -0.77 4.7 1150 
Openness  68.8 33.8 10.8 256.4 1153 
Capital account openness -0.67 1.08 -1.84 2.47 1110 
Change term of trade  -0.55 9.9 -107.3 42.9 1105 
Banking Crisis 0.18 0.38 0 1 1222 
Capital account %GDP -5.5 11.72 -64.5 73.81 996 
Volatility real interest rate  20.3 43.68 0.53 261.3 860 
Dummy of financial liberalization  0.69 0.46 0 1 1222 
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Note: the standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and*** indicate statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
                Table   5     :Banking Crises and Economic Growth in African  Countries  (1985-2010) 
                                     Estimation technique : Treatment Effect model ,two step estimation 
                                                Dependent Variable Panel A : Real per capita GDP Growth 
                    1 2 
Lag. log Real per capita GDP -0.018 (0.02) -0.01 (0.019) 
Log. Government Size -0.017 (0.05)*** -0.014 (.005)*** 
Inflation rate  -0.01 (0.003) -0.012 (0.016) 
Real openness 0.015 (0.004)*** 0.013 (0.005)*** 
Log.M2 0.007 (0.003)** 0.007(0.003)** 
Financial liberalisation index 0.012 (0.07)* 0.013 (0.06)* 
banking crises  -0.056 (0.005)** -0.055 (0.025)** 
   
Hazard Lambda 0.04 (4.7)** 0,05 (5.7)** 
                Dependent Variable Panel B : Banking Crises  
Financial liberalisation dummy -0.42 (0.12)*** -0.45(0.12)*** 
 Changes in term of trade   0.002(0.006) 
 volatility  real interest rate  0.001 (0.02) 0.001 (0.002) 
Lag inflation  -0.11 (0.022)  
Current account % GDP -0.011 (0.005)** 0.10(0.005)*** 
   
Rho 0.45 0.41 
Sigma 0.043 0.044 
lambda 0.017 0.05 
number of observations  564 539 
number of countries 41 39 
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Note: the standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and*** indicate statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
    Table 6:    Banking Crises, Financial liberalization  and Economic Growth in African Countries  
                                     Estimation technique : Panel Data Probit Model 
                                                Dependent Variable  : Banking Crisis  
                    1 2 3 4 
 Log Real per capita GDP 0.08 (0.22) 0.07 (0.36) 0.04 (0.25) 0.28 (0.33) 
Growth Real GDP per capita -3.72 (1.35)** -4.0 (1.9)** -3.14 (1.5)** 4.2 (1.9)** 
Inflation rate  0.79 (0.29)*** 0.65 (0.88) 0.57(0.3)** 1.4 (0.81)* 
Real openness 0.02 (0.004)*** 0.009 (0.006) 0.02(0.006)*** 0.004(0.006) 
Log.M2 -0.52(0.21)** -0.85 (0.4)** -0.57(0.25)** 0.81(0.39)** 
Log. Government Size 0.093 (0.020)*** 0.09 (0.028) 0.09(0.02)*** 0.003(0.03) 
Current account % GDP  -0.02 (0.01)**  -0.01(0.01) 
 Volatility  real interest rate  0.007 (0.008)  0.005(0.006) 
Financial liberalisation index -1.22 (7.1)*** -0.83 (0.16)***   
Financial liberalisation dummy   -1.09(0.33)*** -0.72 (0.20)*** 
     
Constant  -3.66 (1.9)* -1.38 (4.8) -3.1 (1.9)  
     
Numbers of observation 863 540 919 579 
Wald chi square 64.78*** 39.52 *** 74.95*** 38.34*** 
LR-ratio test  107.51*** 98.98*** 129.94*** 122.33*** 
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Definitions and Sources of Variables used in Regression Analysis
 
Variable  Definitions and Construction  Source 
Real GDP per Capita. Ratio of real gross domestic product over total population. Real 
growth product is constant local currency unit 
Author’s calculations using International 
Financial Statistics (2011) 
Log. GDP per Capita.  Log of real GDP per Capita. Author’s calculations using International 
Financial Statistics (2011) 
Real GDP per Capita 
growth 
Log difference of real GDP per Capita Author’s calculations using International 
Financial Statistics (2011) 
Government Size. Ratio of government consumption to GDP World Development indicators (2011) 
Inflation rate Log(100 + annual percent change in consumer price index)  Author’s calculations using International 
Financial Statistics (2011) 
Log.M2 Log. of the ratio  M2 as Percentage  GDP Author’s calculations using International 
Financial Statistics (2011) 
Openness  trade  The sum of Export and Import as percentage GDP  World Development indicators (2011) 
Financial Liberalisation  Is an index measuring a country is degree of capital account 
openness, based on binary dummy variables that codify that 
tabulation of restriction on cross border financial transaction 
reports in the IMF annual report on exchange arrangement and 
exchange restriction (AREAER) 
The Chinn –Ita index  
Changes in terms of trade  Differences  in terms of trade  World Development indicators (2011) 
Banking Crises The onset of banking crises dummy, which is equal to 1 in years 
of banking crises episode and 0 otherwise. 
Caprio et al (2005) and Laeven and Valencia 
(2008) 
Current account %GDP Current account balance (% of GDP) World Development indicators (2011) 
Volatility real interest rate  Standard deviation of real interest rate  Author’s calculations using International 
Financial Statistics (2011) 
Dummy of financial 
liberalisation  
Dummy variable based on the year of liberalisation sector.  IMF  
Credit Growth The natural log difference of the ratio of domestic credit 
provided by the banking sector(% of GDP) 
Author’s calculations using International 
Financial Statistics (2011) 
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Table 7 – Conditions Prior to Banking Crises with Economic Slowdowns 
Banking crises Peak in 
GDP 
growth 
Rate (%) 
Peak in 
output 
gap 
(% 
GDP) 
Peak in real credit growth 
rate (%) 
Peak in real 
Interest rate 
(%) 
Current account (%GDP in pre-
crisis year) 
Algeria (1990-1992) 
 
7.55 0.67 0.909 NA 0.31 
Benin (1988-1990) 
 
2.17 4.80 -7.41 20.370 -2.51 
Burkina Faso (1988-
1994) 
 
7.95 4.91 4.19 21.190 -3.43 
Burundi (1994-1995) 
 
5.50 10.61 37.193 16.980 -3.26 
Cameroon (1987-1995) 
 
6.77 6.29 4.978 13.296 -4.27 
Cape Verde (1993-1999) 
 
5.99 4.17 19.787 7.50 -3.83 
Comoros (1994-1995) 
 
8.53 4.16 25.967 10.85 5.01 
Congo, Dem. Rep. (1991-
1994) 
 
4.71 9.82 42.928 7.85 2.01 
Congo, Rep. (1992-2000) 
 
2.59 4.95 52.82 57.425 -16.12 
Cote d’Ivoire (1988-
1991) 
 
3.25 2.45 12.034 18.32 -12.01 
Djibouti (1991) 
 
2.1 3.86 0.45 12.01 -5.6 
Egypt, Arab Rep. (1985-
1992) 
7.56 4.56 6.25 12.6 -10.6 
Ethiopia (1993-1995) 
 
13.85 8.93 14.243 13.219 -2.26 
Gabon (1986-2002) 
 
6.3 8.59 12.6 14.12 -4.01 
Guinea (1985-1993) 
 
NA NA NA NA -30.961 
Guinea-Bissau (1993-
1995) 
 
6.1 1.65 24.757 11.90 -48.950 
Kenya (1985-1993) 
 
6.25 4.56 21.3 11.01 -32.25 
Liberia (1991-1995) 
 
-51.30 25.81 15.301 18.227 -12.3 
Madagascar (1988-1992) 
 
1.95 -0.46 0.595                 2.3 -4.78 
Malawi (1988-1994) 
 
1.62 3.31 NA 8.669 -5.388 
Mali (1987-1994) 
 
8.43 3.99 21.322 24.974 -17.26 
Mozambique (1987-
1991) 
 
NA 2.71 12.01 21.684 -21.864 
Niger (1987-1994) 
 
6.36 1.17 11.161 10.23 -11.03 
Nigeria (1990-1993) 
 
9.89 3.06 31.011 11.632 3.37 
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Source: World Development Bank and authors’ own elaborations 
 
 
Senegal (1988-1992) 
 
6.09 3.67 -1.308 15.334 -12.73 
Sierra Leone (1990-1992) 
 
7.23 5.28 74.79 -51.617 -6.086 
Togo (1993-1995) 
 
6.64 6.47 19.425 14.860 -13.58 
Tunisia (1991-1995) 
 
7.94 5.55 12.5 19.56 -3.78 
Zambia (1989-1996) 
 
6.28 4.84 12.731 -29.998 -9.53 
Zimbabwe (1991-2003) 6.98 2.88 71.825 41.192 -2.454 
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Table 8 –   Economic slowdowns associated  with  banking crises 
 Real credit growth (% pts 
change) 
GDP average 
growth (%) 
Output gap (%pts 
change) 
Years from peak to trough in 
output gap 
Algeria (1990-1992) 
 
-101.87 1.168 0.03 2 
Benin (1988-1990) 
 
1.614 1.254 -1.78 2 
Burkina Faso (1988-1994) 
 
-17.713 3.06 -0.70 6 
Burundi (1994-1995) 
 
-11.704 -5.87 0.59 1 
Cameroon (1987-1995) 
 
-10.980 -3.022 -2.01 7 
Cape Verde (1993-1999) 
 
22.471 6.698 -0.35 6 
Central Afr Rep (1985-
1999) 
 
-84.424 1.088 -0.31 7 
Chad (1985-1992) 
 
-3.628 3.750 3.26 5 
Comoros (1994-1995) 
 
-6.894 -0.833 -1.31 1 
Congo, Dem. Rep. (1991-
1994) 
 
-29.590 -9.072 -4.07 2 
Congo, Rep. (1992-2000) 
 
-57.651 1.388 -0.49 7 
Cote d’Ivoire (1988-1991) 
 
-6.344 0.757 0.10 2 
Djibouti (1991) 
 
-5.074 -4.27 1.87 1 
Egypt, Arab Rep. (1985-
1992) 
 
9.567 3.807 0.66 7 
Equatorial Guinea (1984-
1994) 
 
-41.263 -7.211 29.58 6 
Ethiopia (1993-1995) 
 
-30.615 7.486 -1.89 2 
Gabon (1986-2002) 
 
-12.594 1.657 -0.72 11 
Ghana (1985-1989) 
 
85.703 5.177 0.59 3 
Guinea (1985-1993) 
 
15.6 4.123 0.04 7 
Guinea-Bissau (1993-
1995) 
 
-19.058 3.233 0.77 2 
Kenya (1985-1993) 
 
-1.072 3.649 0.43 5 
Lesotho  -58.978 
 
3.51 7.27 1 
Liberia (1991-1995) 
 
-12.42 -21.662 -100.27 3 
Madagascar (1988-1992) 
 
1.585 1.097 1.65 2 
Malawi (1988-1994) 
 
-8.867 1.580 -1.70 3 
Mali (1987-1994) 
 
-32.082 2.449 0.53 5 
Mauritania (1985-1993) 
 
24.239 2.734 0.41 3 
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Morocco (1985-1990) 
 
21.32 4.514 0.34 3 
Mozambique (1987-1991) 
 
-17.421 7.059 5.09 1 
Niger (1987-1994) 
 
-27.473 1.01 0.31 4 
Nigeria (1990-1993) 
 
3.354 4.517 4.43 2 
Senegal (1988-1992) 
 
3.858 1.301 1.301 3 
Sierra Leone (1990-1992) 
 
-4.853 -4.436 -4.436 1 
Togo (1993-1995) 
 
-18.261 2.577 2.577 2 
Tunisia (1991-1995) 
 
2.841 3.886 3.886 3 
Zambia (1989-1996) 
 
42.840 -0.121 -0.121 3 
Zimbabwe (1991-2003) 166.831 -0.592 -0.592 8 
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Table 9 – Expenditure and the Current account. Change in each variable from the Peak to the Trough in the Output gap 
 
 Household consumption growth (% 
pts change) 
Investment share (%pts GDP 
change) 
Trade balance(% pts GDP 
change) 
Current account (%pts GDP 
change) 
Algeria (1990-1992) 
 
-0.06 -0.061 -0.04 -13.488 
Benin (1988-1990) 
 
-3.38 -3.380 -30.318 -8.777 
Burkina Faso (1988-1994) 
 
-0.83 -0.827 -26.958 -2.200 
Burundi (1994-1995) 
 
-0.20 -0.197 1.18 -0.669 
Cameroon (1987-1995) 
 
1.03 1.039 1.849 -9.352 
Cape Verde (1993-1999) 
 
8.135 8.135 -74.452 -14.110 
Central Afr Rep (1985-
1999) 
 
1.12 1.127 -11.761 -5.717 
Chad (1985-1992) 
 
-0.597 -0.597 -34.706 -9.290 
Comoros (1994-1995) 
 
0.287 0.287 -51.977 -14.078 
Congo, Dem. Rep. (1991-
1994) 
 
0.072 0.072 -1.525 NA 
Congo, Rep. (1992-2000) 
 
-22.771 -22.771 15.968 -18.486 
Cote d’Ivoire (1988-1991) 
 
0.034 0.034 6.003 -24.458 
Djibouti (1991) 
 
NA NA -24.233 NA 
Egypt, Arab Rep. (1985-
1992) 
 
1.055 1.055 -20.107 -3.369 
Equatorial Guinea (1984-
1994) 
 
-13.12 -13.12 -81.167 -10.599 
Ethiopia (1993-1995) 0.145 3.24 -3.01 -0.234 
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Gabon (1986-2002) 0.533 
 
0.533 -3.686 -39.724 
Ghana (1985-1989) 
 
0.193 0.193 -14.123 -6.407 
Guinea (1985-1993) 
 
-1.946 -0.162 1.820 -20.848 
Guinea-Bissau (1993-
1995) 
 
-0.608 -1.377 -47.323 -46.862 
Kenya (1985-1993) 
 
0.194 0.281 -10.483 -6.433 
Liberia (1991-1995) 
 
-0.995 -0.995 NA NA 
Madagascar (1988-1992) 
 
0.027 -0.185 -19.708 -14.498 
Malawi (1988-1994) 
 
-3.417 -3.417 -38.148 -31.499 
Mali (1987-1994) 
 
-0.671 -0.671 -35.910 -18.215 
Mauritania (1985-1993) 
 
-0.162 -0.162 -17.633 -16.217 
Morocco (1985-1990) 
 
0.321 0.321     -8.829 -4.437 
Mozambique (1987-1991) 
 
-0.116 -0.116 -53.97 -36.706 
Niger (1987-1994) 
 
2.441 -2.101                     -7.740 -21.87 
Nigeria (1990-1993) 
 
-4.235 -3.692 11.542 5.306 
Senegal (1988-1992) 
 
-0.449 0.189 -14.837 -20.467 
Sierra Leone (1990-1992) 
 
1.785 1.785 -1.781 0.825 
Togo (1993-1995) 
 
2.143 2.961 -12.683 -20.858 
Tunisia (1991-1995) 1.926 1.926 -10.835 -13.283 
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Source: World Development Bank and authors’ own elaborations 
 
 
Zambia (1989-1996) 
 
1.308 1.308 -10.768 -12.11 
Zimbabwe (1991-2003) -0.369 -0.369 -3.702 -12.25 
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                    Timing Banking Crises and Financial liberalization in African countries   
 
Country Year of 
financial 
liberalisation 
 Year of 
banking 
crises 
                                 Comment  Systemic 
Crises: 
Yes/No? 
Algeria  1990   1990-1992 In 1989, five government-owned banks were granted managerial and financial autonomy from 
the central government. In the transition to a market economy, nonperforming loans (equivalent 
to 30% of total loans) created problems for some banks in 1990, and the Central bank had to 
provide discount financing to these banks. 
Yes 
Benin 1989  1988-1990 All three commercial banks collapsed. Yes 
Burkine Faso 1989 1988-1994 In 1989, the system of sectoral credit ratios was abolished, and deposit and lending rates were 
partially liberalized. During 1990, the financial condition of the banking sector deteriorated 
sharply. Nonperforming loans increased to 23 percent of total credit, and commercial banks’ 
deposits in the money market declined sharply. Three major commercial banks urgently needed 
restructuring, while two other large banks continued to experience liquidity problems. In 1991, 
the government merged these three major commercial banks into one bank with minority 
government participation and rehabilitated the two other banks, while assuming nonperforming 
assets. 
Yes 
Burnudi 1986 1994-1995 In 1995 one bank was liquidated. Yes 
Cameroon 1990 1987-1995 Five commercial banks were closed and three banks were restructured.  Yes 
Cape Verde  1993-1999 In 1993, the former monobank was split into a Central Bank and a commercial bank, with 90 
percent of banking system deposits. The commercial bank had accumulated a large fraction of 
nonperforming assets and was recapitalized by the government in 1994 by converting its 
portfolio of nonperforming loans into interest-bearing notes to the equivalent of 17.5 percent of 
GDP. All commercial banking interest rates were liberalized in 1994, with the exception of one 
benchmark interest rate on time deposits. 
Yes 
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Central African Rep. 1990 1985-1999 The two largest banks, accounting for 90% of assets, were restructured.  Yes 
Chad  1990 1985-1992 The Chadian banking system came close to collapse in 1992, owing mainly to the vulnerable 
state of the economy and an expansionary credit policy. To avoid a major financial crisis, the 
monetary authorities embarked on a comprehensive rehabilitation program of the banking 
system, involving enhancement of central bank supervision through the COBAC, and the 
liberalization of banking activity. In addition, they eased the liquidity crisis of the commercial 
banks in 1993 by consolidating into a long-term loan to the Government the rediscounted 
commercial bank loans that had been extended mainly to public enterprises. Credit policy was 
tightened; the amount of direct advances to the Treasury by the Central Bank was stabilized; and 
the Banque Internationale pour le Commerce et 1'Industrie du Tchad was liquidated. As a result, 
the net foreign assets position of the banking system was strengthened and the liquidity position 
of the banks was gradually restored. 
Yes 
Congo, Dem. Rep.   1991-1994 Four state-owned banks were insolvent; a fifth bank was to be recapitalized with private 
participation.Two state-owned banks have been liquidated and two other state banks privatized. 
In 1997, 12 banks were having serious financial difficulties. 
Yes 
Congo, Rep.  1990 1992-2000 Between 2001 and 2002, two large banks were restructured and privatized.  The remaining 
insolvent bank is in the process of being liquidated.  Situation aggravated by the civil war. 
Yes 
Côte d’Ivoire  1989 1988-1991 The recession of 1987 and problems with the cocoa and coffee markets (main exports) 
substantially increased private sector's non-performing loans. These problems were aggravated 
by a large amount of nonperforming loans in the public enterprise sectors, the large 
accumulation of government payment arrears, the substantial decline in public and private 
deposits in the banking system, reduction in credit lines from abroad, and poor management in 
some banks. Four large banks affected, accounting for 90% of banking system loans; three 
definitely and one possibly insolvent. Six government banks closed. 
Yes 
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Djibouti   1991 Two of six commercial banks ceased operations in 1991–92; other banks experienced 
difficulties. 
Yes 
Egypt  1991 1985-1992 The government closed several large investment companies. Yes 
Equatorial Guinea   1984-1994 Two of the country’s largest banks were liquidated.  Yes 
Ethiopia  1993-1995 A government-owned bank was restructured, and its nonperforming loans were taken over by the 
government. 
No 
Gabon 1990 1986-2002 One bank was temporarily closed in 1995. No 
Ghana 1987 1985-1989 Seven of eleven audited banks insolvent; rural banking sector affected. Yes 
Guinea  1985-1993 Six banks—accounting for 99% of system deposits—deemed insolvent.  Repayment of deposits 
amounted to 3% of 1986 GDP. 
Yes 
Guinea Bissau 1989 1993-1995 At end-1996, the Central Bank’s had a negative capital position and Guinea-Bissau’s two 
commercial banks had substantial nonperforming loans. In March-April 1997, the treasury 
recapitalized the Central Bank. 
Yes 
Kenye 1991 1985-1993 Four banks and twenty-four nonbank financial institutions—accounting for 15% of financial 
system liabilities—faced liquidity and solvency problems. 
Yes 
Lesotho  1988-1991 One of four commercial banks suffered from large nonperforming loans.  No 
Liberia  1991-1995 Seven of eleven banks not operational; in mid-1995 their assets accounted for 64 percent of bank 
assets. 
 
Madagascar 1994 1988-1992 After the formal abandonment in 1985 of the previous policy of bank specialization and the 
appointment in 1986 of separate boards of directors to replace the single board that was share by 
all commercial banks, the rehabilitation of the banking system gained speed with the enactment 
in 1988 of a new banking law, which opened the system to private capital, and the decision in 
1989 to write off most of the nonperforming loans of the existing banks. 
Yes 
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         Sources: Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, 1999); Laeven and Valencia, (2008). Reinhart & Tokatlidis (2003); Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache
Mali 1989 1987-1994 Mali’s economic and financial prospects for 1986 and the medium term changed significantly 
due to the collapse in late 1985 of the world market price of cotton, Mali’s major export 
commodity. In 1987, although the Government undertook some corrective measures, the 
economic and financial situation deteriorated rapidly. The expansion of credit was significantly 
higher than programmed, and as a result, nonperforming loans at banks increased rapidly. Owing 
primarily to the overexposure of the largest commercial bank in terms of its loans and 
guaranteed letters of credit, a liquidity crunch emerged in the banking system. The financial 
situation of the largest commercial bank deteriorated further in 1987, reflecting the heavy losses 
of the public enterprise sector that it had financed over the years, defaults by the private sector 
on unsecured loans, and inappropriate management. By mid-November 1997, the bank had 
become virtually illiquid and ceased functioning normally. Its nonperforming loans amounted to 
some 70 percent of its outstanding credit. 
Yes 
Mauritania 1990 1985-1993 In 1984 five major banks had nonperforming assets ranging from 45–70 percent of their 
portfolios. 
Yes 
Morocco 1989 1995-1990 Banking sector experienced solvency problems. Debt crisis 1980-83 Yes 
Mozambique 1994 1987-1991 Main commercial bank experienced solvency problems that became apparent after 1992. Yes 
Niger 1987 1987-1994 In the mid-1980s banking system nonperforming loans reached 50 percent. Four banks were 
liquidated and three restructured in the late 1980s.  In 2002, a new round of bank restructuring 
was launched.  Four banks were experiencing serious difficulties.  Two of them were to be 
restructured and the other two might be liquidated. 
Yes 
Nigeria 1991 1990-1993 In 1993 insolvent banks accounted for 20 percent of banking system assets and 22 percent of 
deposits. In 1995 almost half the banks reported being in financial distress. 
Yes 
Senegal 1989 1988-1992 In 1988, 50 percent of banking system loans were nonperforming. Six commercial banks and 
one development bank closed, accounting for 20–30 percent of financial system assets. 
Yes 
Sierra Leone 1991 1990-1992 One bank’s license was suspended in 1994. Bank recapitalization and restructuring are ongoing. Yes 
Togo 1989 1993-1995 Banking sector experienced solvency problems. Yes 
Tunisia 1990 1991-1995 In 1991 most commercial banks were undercapitalized.  During 1991-94, the banking system 
raised equity equivalent to 1.5% of GDP and made provisions equivalent to another 1.5%. 
No 
Zambia 1992 1989-1996 Meridian Bank, accounting for 13% of commercial bank assets, became insolvent. Yes 
Zimbabwe 1993 1991-2003 Two of five commercial banks have high nonperforming loans. Yes 
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   Figure 1. Frequency of Banking Crises in African Countries, 1985-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
Figure 2 –  
Algeria GDP (million US$), 1985-2010 
                                                                                                         Rate of Growth of GDP and domestic credit in Algeria, % values  
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Notes: the two vertical lines indicate the banking crisis period 1990-1992. 
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Figure 3 – Cameroon GDP (million US$), 1985-2010         Rate of Growth of GDP and domestic credit in Cameroon, % values  
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                                                                                                Notes: the two vertical lines indicate the banking crisis period 1987-1995. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.                                                                                         Rate of Growth of GDP and domestic credit in Egypt, % values  
Figure 4 – Egypt GDP (million US$), 1985-2010 
 
 
-
20
-
10
0
10
20
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
year
Domestic credit growth Egypt GDP growth Egypt
 
Notes: the two vertical lines indicate the banking crisis period 1985-1992 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 6– Kenya GDP (million US$), 1985-2010 
                                                                                                              Rate of Growth of GDP and domestic credit in Kenya, % values  
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Notes: the two vertical lines indicate the banking crisis period 1985-1993. 
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  Figure 7 – Nigeria  GDP (million US$), 1985-2010      Rate of Growth of GDP and domestic credit in Nigeria, % values  
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                                                                                                                     Notes: the two vertical lines indicate the banking crisis period 1990-1993. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 – South Africa GDP (million US$), 1985-2010                        Rate of Growth of GDP and domestic credit in South Africa, % 
values  
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Figure 13 – Tunisia GDP (million US$), 1985-2010                    Rate of Growth of GDP and domestic credit in Tunisia, % values  
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                                                                                                                                            Notes: the two vertical lines indicate the banking crisis period 1991-1995. 
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